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THE JACOBS CASE: PENNSYLVANIA CONTRACT
BOND LAW GOES MODERN
By DANIEL

MUNGALL, JR.t

N THIS ERA of booming construction, surety bonds are increasingly utilized to assure the discharge of a contractor's obligations.
A performance bond guarantees the owner that the work will be
completed. A payment bond guarantees that persons supplying labor
and material in connection with the project' will be paid. Private
owners require payment bonds to protect their property against mechanics' liens; public owners generally do so pursuant to statutory
requirements manifesting a venerable policy of protecting the artisans
whose labor and material have gone into public projects.
Contrary to a widely accepted misconception, a surety bond is
not an insurance contract; it is a guarantee. As between the surety
and the contractor, the latter has the primary obligation. The surety,
in executing a bond, expects the contractor to complete the job and
pay his suppliers. Hopefully, the contract price will cover both undertakings. If it will not, the surety expects the contractor to make up
any loss, if he can.
When the contractor defaults and the surety responds in accordance with its obligation, the surety looks to the unpaid contract
price as the principal means of reducing or eliminating its loss.
Its claim to the contract balance is based on the equitable principle
of subrogation, which is the substitution of one person in place of
another with reference to a lawful claim or right.2 Subrogation is
available when the property of one person is used to discharge an
obligation owed by another under such circumstances that the other
would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefit so conferred. The person whose property has been so used is substituted for
the obligee with respect to the obligee's claims or rights against the
other person.3 In the present context, the surety which discharges
t A.B., 1937, Yale University; LL.B., 1940, Harvard University; member,
Pennsylvania Bar.
1. The bond language and any applicable statutory provision determine the claims
covered by the bond.

2. 50 AM. JUR. Subrogation § 2 (1944).
3. RESTATUMFNT, RPsrrtrsIoN § 162 (1937): "The general rule is well settled
that if a surety has paid a debt, he is entitled to all the securities the creditor had
against the principal debtor." Sundheim v. School District, 311 Pa. 90, 101, 166 Atd. 365,
369 (1933).
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the contractor's obligations is substituted for the owner with respect to the latter's rights against the contractor.
The surety's successful assertion of a right to the contract balance by way of subrogation involves two steps. The surety must
first establish that it is entitled to claim subrogation. This is done
by discharging, pursuant to its suretyship, the contractor's obligations
to the owner. The surety must then establish that the owner had a
right which it might have asserted as a result of the contractor's default. The surety is then entitled to this right under principles of
subrogation. Unfortunately, courts have not clearly differentiated between these two steps - a failure which has led to some confusing
language in the opinions on the subject.
When a surety completes the construction under its performance
bond, its subrogation to the contract balance is virtually automatic.
If, on the contractor's default, the owner hires another to completd
the work, the owner has the clear right to apply the unpaid contract
price to the cost of completion. When the surety completes the construction, it fulfills the contractor's obligations to the owner and is
subrogated to that right of the owner. This universal principle was
enunciated almost seventy years ago in the landmark decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Prairie State Nat'l Bank v. United
States.4 In that case the contractor defaulted and the surety completed the performance. Both the surety and a bank holding the contractor's assignment claimed the contract balance. The surety was
successful because, the Supreme Court said, it was subrogated to
the rights of the owner to use the contract balances to cure the default.
However, where a surety is required merely to pay the contractor's
suppliers, its right to the contract balance has been more hotly, and
sometimes successfully, contested. The difficulty stems from the fact
that the surety pays third persons, rather than the owner. From
this some have concluded that the owner had no rights to which
the surety could claim subrogation. This confusion results from a
failure to appreciate the legal effect of the payment bond.
A payment bond, in form, is an agreement between the contractor
and the surety to pay the owner a specified sum. There is a condition, however, nullifying that obligation if the contractor pays his
laborers and materialmen. In practical effect this is an agreement
by the contractor and the surety with the owner that the former will
pay the contractor's suppliers. It is now universally recognized that
the suppliers may sue and recover on such a bond as third party
4. 164 U.S. 227 (1896).
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beneficiaries. What is often lost sight of is the fact that the basic
promise to pay suppliers has been made to the owner.
The contractor has dual obligations to his suppliers. One arises
from his direct contracts with those suppliers. The other arises
from the payment bond of which the suppliers are third party beneficiaries. 5 The promisee of the payment bond is the owner. When
the surety pays the suppliers, it satisfies not only the contractor's dual
obligations to the suppliers but also the undertaking which the contractor gave to the owner that the suppliers would be paid. Under
principles of subrogation, the surety should be entitled to any rights
which the suppliers have against the contractor and also any rights
which the owner has as a result of the breach of the bond obligation
to pay those suppliers.
In the leading case of Henningsen v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co.' decided in 1908, the United States Supreme Court held, on the
authority of Prairie State, that a surety which paid the contractor's
suppliers had a right to the contract balance which was superior to
that of an assignee bank. While the precise basis for this superiority
was not detailed in the opinion, Henningsen's reliance on Prairie
State makes it clear that the surety was subrogated to rights of the
owner. Implicit in this conclusion is the reasoning that the contractor
was obligated to the owner to pay his bills, that the breach of that
obligation gave the owner the right to apply the contract balance to
the payment of these bills and that the surety's curing of that default
entitled it to that right of the owner. While some cases appear to
have questioned the validity of this reasoning," the recent United
States Supreme Court decision in Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co.'
ringingly reaffirmed the payment bond surety's right to the contract
balance by way of subrogation.
Pennsylvania law on the rights of a payment bond surety to
contract balances was not so clear. While some decisions recognized
5. Martin v. Nat'l Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1937); Continental Cas. Co. v.
United States, 169 F. Supp. 945 (Ct. Cl. 1959) ; Note, Reconsideration of Subrogation
Rights of the Miller Act Payment Bond Surety, 71 YALE L.J. 1274 (1962). At one

point Pennsylvania considered that suppliers had no right to sue on a bond conditioned

upon the payment of persons supplying labor and material, Greene County v. Southern
Co., 292 Pa. 304, 141 Ati. 27 (1928). That view has been abandoned, Commonwealth

v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 312 Pa. 183, 147 At. 793 (1933), but the suppliers are third
party beneficiaries of a promise which is made to the owner as promisee.

6. 208 U.S. 404 (1908).
7. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947), held that the United

States had a right to set-off unrelated debts of the contractor against the contract
balance despite the claim of a payment bond surety. American Sur. Co. v. Hinds,
260 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1958), and Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Earle, 218 F.2d 645 (9th
Cir. 1955), construed Munsey as denying the surety any right of the owner. The
conflict in the federal court decisions generated by this view prompted the Supreme

Court to grant certiorari in Pearlman, infra, in which Henningsen was reaffirmed.
8. 371 U.S. 132 (1962). See text at p. 53, infra.
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such a right, others did not. The fact that a payment bond surety
executed the bond and paid the claimants did not assure it the right
to the contract balance. In addition, the construction contract and
underlying statutes, if any, had to be consulted. The decisions developed principles somewhat disconnected from suretyship realities,
and left interesting but unanswered questions.
One of the early Pennsylvania appellate court decisions was
Mock v. Bechtel,9 which awarded the contract balance to the contractor's trustee rather than the payment bond surety. Under the
provisions of the bond and under the procedures set forth in the state
statutes which were expressly incorporated by reference into the bond,
no supplier could initiate a suit on the bond until six months after
the contract price was paid to the contractor. The court concluded
that the inability of materialmen to sue on the bond until after the
contract balance was paid to the contractor negated the possibility that
the contract balance was intended to be security to the owner for
the performance of any obligation of the contractor to pay the suppliers.
The absence of a right in the owner left nothing for the surety to claim
under principles of subrogation.
Mock distinguished the federal decisions, presumably including
Henningsen, on the ground that this "method of procedure" prescribed
in the state statute and in the bond was wholly different from that
prescribed for the construction of federal projects. In this respect
Mock is essentially a sport, turning on the peculiar provisions of
that bond and statute' ° and was so treated by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Lancaster County Nat'l Bank's Appeal" which was, until
recently, the leading Pennsylvania decision awarding the contract
balance to a payment bond surety.
Lancaster involved a highway contract with the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. There was a single bond which contained both
performance and payment conditions and which had been supplied
pursuant to the statute which had been incorporated by reference
into the Mock bond. The contract, however, expressly provided that
the semi-final or final estimate would be withheld until all claims for
labor and materials had been settled. The contractor failed to pay his
suppliers. The surety did so, and then claimed the contract balance
against an assignee bank. The court rejected a contention of the bank
that its right was superior because the surety had failed to give notice of
its assignment contained in the contractor's application for the bonds.
9. 101 Pa. Super. 181 (1931).
10. No other Pennsylvania decision on subrogation has involved such bond
provisions.
11. 304 Pa. 437, 158 Atl. 859 (1931).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss1/2

4

Mungall: The Jacobs Case: Pennsylvania Contract Bond Law Goes Modern
FALL

1965]

THE JACOBS CASE

The court concluded this discussion with the observation that the
bank was on notice that the statute required a surety and that common
prudence required the bank, before it made a loan, to investigate the
circumstances under which the surety assumed its liability. This discussion of assignments was immaterial to the subrogation claim of
the surety.
Without indicating that it was turning to a different issue, the
court then stated that the point in dispute had been decided in favor
of the surety in Henningsen. The court quoted the portion of the Henningsen opinion holding that the surety, not the assignee bank, was
entitled to subrogation and declared itself in complete accord with the
Henningsen statement of the law. Thus, while the first part of the
opinion dealt with the assignment rights of the parties, the actual
decision was based on the surety's right to the contract balance by
way of subrogation.
The Lancaster opinion concluded by distinguishing Mock in a
very curious fashion. It said that Mock was decided against the
surety because the contract there contained no provision for the protection of suppliers and there was no statutory requirement that it do
so; that, for that reason, the method of procedure "provided by the
applicable statute" in Mock was wholly different from that involved
in federal construction projects; and that Lancaster, on the other
hand, involved substantially the same statute, contract and procedure
as prescribed for federal works. Yet the statute involved in Lancaster was the same statute as had been incorporated by reference
in the Mock bond!
Despite this statutory identity, Lancaster differed substantially
from Mock. In Mock the statutory provision that suppliers might
not institute suit until six months after final settlement with the
owner was repeated in the bond itself; this was not true of the
Lancaster bond. The Mock contract contained no provision for
the protection of suppliers; the Lancaster contract expressly reserved
to the owner the right to withhold contract balances upon the contractor's failure to pay suppliers. In Mock, the statutory and bond
language was considered to evidence an intent that the owner pay
the contractor in full and that unpaid suppliers might thereafter sue
on the bond. While the statutory language in Lancaster must necessarily have suggested the same intent as the court found in Mock,
the express provision in the Lancaster contract was a clearer and more
compelling expression of a contrary intent.
When it is remembered that the important question is whether
the owner has a right to withhold contract payments if the contractor
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fails to pay his suppliers, the results in both Mock and Lancaster
become reasonably acceptable. The opinions might better have addressed themselves to this precise question. Thus, Mock could have
stated specifically that, in the absence of contract language, the bond
and statutory provisions indicated that the owner had no such right;
Lancaster might better have said that the affirmative contract language
in that case overcame the negative implication of the statutory provision and that the owner had such a right. Conceivably this might
have pointed the way to different results in two subsequent cases
which were, in effect, overruled by Jacobs v. Northeastern Cor12
poration.
Pennsylvania imposed a peculiar limitation on the Henningsen
principle in Sundheim v. School District.13 In that case a separate
payment bond was procured by the owner pursuant to statute which
required school districts to obtain an "additional bond" providing for
the payment of all labor and material. This statute did not contain
a six month provision similar to the clause in the statute involved
in Mock and Lancaster. The contractor failed to complete the work
and to pay his suppliers. The surety completed the performance and
paid the suppliers. The school district paid the surety an amount
retained to cover the costs of completing the work and paid the retained percentage into court where it was claimed by the surety because of its payments to suppliers and by the receiver of the contractor.
The court awarded the balance to the receiver.
In answer to the surety's contention that the failure to pay
suppliers was a default in the construction contract, the court pointed
out that an owner, at common law, had no duty to the contractor's
suppliers, that that status had been changed by the mechanic's lien
statutes and that public bodies were exempt from such statutory liability. This discussion of the obligations of the owner to the suppliers
was wide of the mark because the concern, in this context, is not with
obligations but with rights of the owner. Only obligations of the
contractor are pertinent, and they are important because the breach
thereof may create rights in the owner which the surety may acquire
b subrogation.
The court distinguished Lancasterand Henningsen in this fashion:
It has been held by federal courts that there is a direct contractual
obligation to the government as a party to the contract, binding
on the contractor and surety, to pay labor and materialmen.
Consequently, when the contractor fails to pay labor and materialmen, it is tantamount to a breach of its contract with the United
12. 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 (1965).
13. 311 Pa. 90, 166 At. 365 (1933).
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States government. When this occurs and the surety pays the
labor and materialmen, it stands in the position of a surety
completing a contractual obligation of a defaulting contractor and
performing an equitable duty to the United States. It is therefore entitled to subrogation to the rights of the United States
in the fund. Subrogation does not arise through the contractor
but from the government's rights: Prairie State Bank v. U.S.,
164 U.S. 227; Henningsen v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. of Baltimore, 208 U.S. 404; In re Scofield, 215 Fed. 45. In Pennsylvania,
where our statutes and the facts coincide with the cases decided
by the federal courts, we are in harmony with those decisions
as illustrated by Lancaster County National Bank's App., 304
Pa. 437. (Emphasis added.) 4
Contrary to this last sentence, the statute involved in Lancaster did
not coincide with the federal statute involved in Henningsen. The
statute involved in Sundheim more nearly coincided with the existing
federal statute except that it contemplated a separate bond covering
laborers and materialmen rather than a single bond covering both
payment and performance obligations. Moreover, the salient facts
in Sundheim coincided with those involved in Henningsen. There
is no indication in the Henningsen opinion that the contract in that
case gave the owner any express rights in the event of non-payment
of suppliers or imposed any obligation on the contractor to pay his
suppliers. Thus, the placing of Lancaster and Henningsen in one
category and Sundheim in another because of the statutes and facts
involved was simply not justified.
Sundheim next observed that a state statute required school
districts to obtain payment bonds, but that, when such a bond was
procured, "no new or additional duty is imposed on such districts to
see that labor and materialmen are in fact paid."'" This concern with
obligations of the owner again missed the point. Continuing, the court
stated that there was no obligation in the performance bond nor in
the contract to pay suppliers, so that the failure to pay did not breach
either of these instruments. The court then met and disposed of, indirectly, the essential question in the case with a single sentence:
Nor was it intended by the Acts of 1917 and 1925 that their
provisions should become a part of such contract so as to make
such failure a default under these instruments. 6
The questions which should have been posed and answered were,
whether the payment bond imposed on the contractor an obligation
14. Id. at 97, 166 AtI. at 367-68.
15. Id. at 97, 166 Ati. at 368.
16. Id. at 98, 166 AtI. at 368.
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running to the owner to pay persons supplying labor and material and,
if so, whether the breach of that obligation gave the owner any rights
with respect to the contract balances. The result in the case must have
been prompted by a negative answer to one of these questions, but which
one was so answered and the reason for the answer were left shrouded
in mystery by the Sundheim opinion.
It cannot be doubted that a payment bond imposes a contractual
obligation on the contractor to pay his suppliers. Thus, the conclusion
in Sundheim can only be explained on the basis either that the payment bond, being a requirement of statute, named the owner as obligee as a mere matter of form, or that the obligations embodied in
the payment bond, while running to the owner, were completely
separate and apart from the construction contract so that the breach
of the former had no effect on the rights and obligations embodied in
the latter. The Sundheim characterization of the payment and performance bonds as "two distinct and separate obligations" suggests
that the court was adopting this latter basis. The subsequent discussion does not, however, appear to follow this concept to a conclusion.
Justification of Sundheim on the ground that the owner is obligee
in form only is very dubious in view of the facts that the payment
bond named the owner as obligee and that the statute required the
owner to procure the bond. The statutory duty was on the owner
to obtain the additional bond, not on the contractor to supply it. As
to the proposition that the obligations of the payment bond are separate
and apart from the construction contract, those obligations cannot be
construed without reference to the construction contract since the latter
determines what labor and material are to be supplied and thus which
suppliers are guaranteed payment by the bond. It is quite artificial
to suggest that instruments so inter-related represent separate, distinct
and independent undertakings.
The decision in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Germantown
& Trust Co., 7 in which the payment bond surety unsuccessfully
claimed the contract balance by assignment rather than subrogation,
is significant in this discussion only because of its characterization
of Lancaster as deciding that the surety "had paid the claims of materialmen and stood subrogated to their rights."' 8 This appears to
be the first suggestion that the suppliers had any rights in the contract balances which the surety could acquire by subrogation and is
directly contrary to the Sundheim characterization of Lancaster as
17. 320 Pa. 129, 182 Atd. 362 (1936).
18. Id. at 134, 182 At. at 365.
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49

coinciding with the federal decisions such as Prairie State and Henningsen which Sundheirn interpreted as subrogating the surety to
rights of the owner. With the court taking contrary views in 1933
and 1936 as to what it had decided in 1931, it is no wonder that the
law of Pennsylvania in this area has been somewhat confused, uncertain and unrealistic.
In 1941 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed and solidified the distinction between the Lancaster and Sundheim situations.
DuBois v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.' 9 was a successful action
by a contractor's trustee in bankruptcy to recover a contract balance
paid by the owner to the surety which had paid the contractor's suppliers. The court again rejected the contention that the contractor's
failure to pay for labor and materials was a default in the contract,
and said that the owner retained no rights against the contractor
to which the surety could have been subrogated.
The court asserted that the contract conferred no right on the
materialmen to obtain payment of their bills nor to file liens, and
contained no provision entitling the owner to withhold funds for
the payment of such claims. It held that the surety was not subrogated
to any right of the owner but to the rights of the suppliers against
the contractor. The observation that suppliers had no right to be
paid nor to lien was irrelevant to a consideration of the obligations
of the contractor and the rights of the owner. The assertion that
there was no provision permitting the owner to withhold payment of
suppliers was pertinent to, but not dispositive of, the important question. Such a provision provides an express right which the surety
can acquire by subrogation. However, if the contractor promises to
pay his suppliers, the failure to do so is a breach of contract for
which the law provides remedies even in the absence of remedies
expressed in the contract. The most obvious of these is the owner's
right to withhold his promised performance, that is, the payment of the
contract price, and to use it to cure the default. Thus, even in the
absence of an express right to withhold and apply contract balances
upon the contractor's failure to pay suppliers, the presence of an
obligation to the owner to pay the suppliers should be sufficient to
provide the owner with rights, in the event of non-payment of suppliers, which the surety can claim by subrogation. DuBois was
silent on the question of why the breach of the contractor's obligation in the payment bond did not create rights in the owner which
the surety could claim by subrogation.
19. 341 Pa. 85, 18 A.2d 802 (1941).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1965], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

11 : p. 41

Sundheim had attempted to dispose of this question with the
statement that the statutes pursuant to which the payment bond was
procured were not intended to become part of the contract, and as
a result of this, the failure to pay suppliers was not a breach of the
construction contract. The DuBois contract was with the Commonwealth and the City of Scranton so that the payment bond was undoubtedly procured as a result of a state statute. The DuBois opinion,
however, does not even discuss the statutory origin of the payment
bond involved there and does not appear to rely at all on the reasoning which prompted the Sundheim conclusion.
The surety in DuBois contended that the payment bond was incorporated by reference into the construction contract so as to create
a Lancaster type situation. The court concluded however, that the
language was not sufficiently "definite or pertinent" to accomplish
such an incorporation. It was significant that the court did not rule
out the possibility that an incorporation by reference of the payment
bond into the construction contract might have altered the result by
bringing about a Lancaster situation.
These decisions, Mock, Lancaster, Sundheim and DuBois, represented the Pennsylvania law on the rights of payment bond sureties
until Jacobs was decided in January of 1965. From these cases, the
following conclusions emerged:
1. When the payment bond language indicated that the suppliers
could not sue until after the owner had paid the contractor in full as
in Mock, the owner had no rights which the surety could claim under
principles of subrogation, in the event the contractor failed to pay
suppliers;
2. When the construction contract contained an express reservation to the owner of the right to retain and use the contract balance
to pay suppliers as in Lancaster, the surety was entitled to the contract balance under principles of subrogation despite the fact that
the underlying statute requiring the payment bond contained the same
provision as in Mock;
3. When the construction contract imposed an obligation on the
contractor to pay his suppliers, Sundheim indicated that the Lancaster
rule applied and the payment bond surety was entitled to the contract balance;
4. When the contract contained no express reservation to the
owner of a right to retain and use contract balances to pay suppliers
and no undertaking by the contractor to pay suppliers and the payment bond was obtained by a public body as required by state statute
as in Sundheim and DuBois, the contractor's failure to pay suppliers
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was not a default in the construction contract and the surety could
not claim the unpaid contract balance.
This pre-Jacobs state of the Pennsylvania law posed some interesting questions. Suppose a private owner had required a payment bond
in connection with a contract that (a) contained no undertaking by
the contractor to pay suppliers, (b) did not expressly reserve any
right to the owner in the event of non-payment of suppliers and (c)
did not incorporate the payment bond by reference. Suppose further
that both the contractor and the surety became insolvent and unable
to pay the contractor's suppliers. It is inconceivable that the court
would have held that the owner had no right to use contract balances
to pay the suppliers, thereby reducing or eliminating the risk of
mechanic's lien claims being filed against the owner's property. Yet
to reach such a conclusion the court would either have to overrule
Sundheint and DuBois or to create an artificial and essentially meaningless distinction between public and private contracts. The private
owner has a direct interest in the payment bond because of the risk
that suppliers may lien his property. The public owner's interest is
not as obvious since the suppliers can not lien public works, but that
interest, which stems from the public policy of protecting the persons
whose contributions make public works possible, is just as real as
that of the private owner.
Suppose a public contract expressly made the payment bond one
of the contract documents and incorporated it by reference into the
construction contract. It seems obvious that the failure to pay suppliers would be a breach of the construction contract giving the
owner the right to use the unpaid contract price to pay those suppliers.
While the incorporation of the payment bond into the construction
contract eliminates any possibility of saying that the bond is an obligation separate and apart from the contract, those words hardly
imply an intention to alter substantially the obligations of the parties.
The fact is that the payment bond is just as much a part of the
construction contract package as the performance bond, although it
serves a different purpose. The incorporation by reference merely
expresses what should be perfectly obvious from the realities of the
situation.
The Sundheim emphasis on the fact that there were two bonds
involving separate and distinct obligations suggests that a different
result might have been reached had there been a single bond conditioned both upon the performance of the contract and upon the payment
of suppliers. A distinction with respect to the rights of the owner
in the event of the contractor's non-payment of suppliers on the basis
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of whether there were one or two bonds has no substantive basis
and would tend to highlight the error of the Sundheim result.
Thus, the Pennsylvania law on the subrogation rights of a payment bond surety was both unsettled and unsatisfactory. Despite
this, the Pennsylvania appellate courts did not have occasion to deal
with the problem between 1941 when DuBois was decided and 1965.
During that period the United States Supreme Court handed down
two significant decisions in the field. In United States v. Munsey
Trust Co.,2" the Supreme Court held that the United States was entitled to set-off against the contract balances, at the expense of the
payment bond surety, debts of the contractor arising from matters
unrelated to the contract. The result and the language in the opinion
led some to conclude that Henningsen was no longer good law. 21 In
1962, however, the Supreme Court decided Pearlman v. Reliance Ins.
Co.,2" which reaffirmed Henningsen in strong and unmistakable terms.
The stage was thus set for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to reconsider its entire position and this it did in Jacobs.
Jacobs involved disputes over the unpaid balances in two contracts between the contractor's receiver and the sureties which had
been called upon to pay persons supplying labor and material. The
court held in favor of the sureties, concluding that the language in
each of the contracts created an express undertaking by the contractor to pay suppliers so as to bring each situation within the Lancaster rule. The court went further, however, saying that it was
time to reconsider its early decisions in this area and "to review the
significance of the applicable statutes governing public work contracts
as they affect the subrogation rights at issue." 23
The court observed that the federal rule and the rule prevailing
in most jurisdictions was contrary to the import of Sundhein and
DuBois. It quoted Mr. Justice Cardozo's observation in Martin v.
Nat'l Surety Co.24 that the terms of a payment bond are read into
a contract so that there is a default in the contract when there is a
default under the bond. It outlined the facts and holding in Pearlian
and then concluded:
Even if we were able to accept appellant's view that the
contracts here in question did not create an obligation in Northeastern to pay labor and materialmen, the surety companies should
still prevail. The doctrine of subrogation is not founded upon
20. Supra note 7.
21. Ibid.

22. 371 U.S. 132 (1962).

23. 416 Pa. 417, 423, 206 A.2d 49, 52 (1965).

24. 300 U.S. 588, 597-98 (1937).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss1/2

12

Mungall: The Jacobs Case: Pennsylvania Contract Bond Law Goes Modern
FALL

1965]

THE JACOBS CASE

contract, and, under these circumstances, is equally generated by
the contractor's compliance with the statutory obligations to provide the bonds in question.25
It is true that the doctrine of subrogation is not founded upon
contract. It is not true that the doctrine "is . . . generated by . . .
compliance with the statutory obligations to provide the bonds. . ....
Subrogation is an equitable right which arises, or is "generated,"
when the surety discharges the contractor's obligations pursuant to
the suretyship.
Sundheim and DuBois did not deny the surety's right to be
subrogated; they decided merely that there was no right which the
surety could acquire by subrogation. This crucial paragraph in Jacobs
might better have corrected the error of those earlier decisions by
stating that the obligation to pay suppliers which arises from a payment bond, whether or not supplied pursuant to a statutory duty, is
one of the obligations of the construction contract, the breach of which
permits the owner to withhold and apply the unpaid contract price
to the payment of suppliers.
It is unfortunate that Jacobs, which brings Pennsylvania squarely
in line with logic and the great weight of authority, did not articulate
its own reasoning with greater clarity. That it accepted the basic
principles discussed herein seems apparent, however, from the language
of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Martin which it selected for quotation
and from its reliance on Pearlnan which reaffirmed the principles
enunciated in Prairie State and Henningsen.
Jacobs' reconsideration of Pennsylvania law on this subject
appears to have been prompted by Pearlman in which the dispute
over the contract balance was between a payment bond surety and the
contractor's trustee in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court there held
that there were three rights to which the surety was entitled by way of
subrogation which gave it a superior right to the contract balances.
One of these rights was described as the right of the suppliers to be
paid out of the fund. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved
this proposition in Jacobs also, saying that the contract balances were
available for the protection and payment of suppliers and that the
funds, had there been no bond, would have gone to the payment of
suppliers rather than to the general creditors.26
It should be apparent from what has been said here that it was
not necessary in order to reach the conclusion in either Pearlnan or
Jacobs that suppliers have a right to be paid out of the contract
25. 416 Pa. 417, 426, 206 A.2d 49, 54 (1965).
26. Id. at 426-27, 206 A.2d at 54.
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balances. Each decision recognized that the owner had rights with
respect to the contract balances which the surety acquired by subrogation. Nonetheless, the statements as to the right of the suppliers
are clear and unequivocal.
Neither Pearlman nor Jacobs indicated the source and nature
of this right of suppliers to the contract balances. A supplier has no
contractual and, at least in Pennsylvania, no statutory basis for a
direct claim against an owner. The supplier has no right to lien a
public project, and his right to lien a private project may be waived
or is lost if not properly perfected. Thus, if suppliers have such a
right, it is because the courts are prepared to create such a right.
The right must necessarily be somewhat limited. Undoubtedly,
the supplier will not be able to claim the contract balance until all
obligations of the contractor to the owner have been satisfied including,
perhaps, obligations which do not arise out of the contract in question. 7
This will limit the right to situations in which the owner is a mere
stakeholder.
Other interesting questions may arise. Are persons with claims
for insurance premiums, rental of equipment and capital expenditures,
which are not labor and material as those terms are used in a payment
bond,2" entitled to assert this right? If the insurance and the rented
or purchased equipment has been acquired in connection with the
construction project, the supplier may properly contend that he has
contributed to the project to the same extent as other suppliers.
The court will have no statutory or contractual language against
which to determine who are entitled to assert this right. Will the
claim of an unpaid supplier have priority over a bank which has
lent money to the contractor and taken an assignment which has been
properly filed under the Uniform Commercial Code? If a bank lends
money which is used to pay obligations incurred in the prosecution of
work, will the bank be a member of the class? One court has commented on the difficulty involved in accurately and justly defining the
limits of any such right29 and this difficulty may very well lead the
courts to reject the existence of such a right when called upon to enforce
it in particular instances.
Despite the unequivocal assertions in Pearlmnan and Jacobs concerning the rights of unpaid suppliers to contract balances, that prop27. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., supra note 7.
28. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Andrews, 354 Pa. 138, 47 A.2d 220 (1946)
(rental of equipment) ; Pittsburgh v. Parkview Constr. Co., 344 Pa. 126, 23 A.2d 847
(1942) (insurance premiums); Commonwealth v. Nat'l Sur. Co., 253 Pa. 5, 97 Atd.
1034 (1916) (machinery, etc.).
29. In re Fowble, 213 Fed. 676, 681 (D.C. Md. 1914), quoted in Pratt Lumber Co.
v. T. H. Gill Co., 278 Fed. 783, 793 (E.D. N.C. 1922).
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osition should be viewed with some reservation. The concurring opinion
in Pearlman declined to recognize such a right, pointing out that
no decision of the United States Supreme Court had held that suppliers.
had any such right, and quoting language in United States v. Munsey
Trust Co."° to the effect that suppliers have no enforceable right
against the United States. The Court of Claims held that there was
such a right in Madden v. United States,31 and that the surety was
32
subrogated to such a right in Royal Indem. Co. v. United States,
and National Sur. Corp. v. United States."3 However, in United
Pacific Ins. Co. v. United States,3 4 that court rejected a contention
of a contractor's trustee in bankruptcy that the surety could not
claim subrogation because it had not paid one of the contractor's
suppliers, and held that the supplier had no right to the contract
balance.
In some cases, courts which have mistakenly assumed that a
failure to pay suppliers could not be a default in the construction
contract so as to give the owner any rights, have said that suppliers
have a right to be paid out of the contract balance as the means of
permitting the surety to reach the contract balance.3
Once it is
recognized that the payment bond is an undertaking to the owner, the
breach of which permits the owner to withhold and apply the unpaid
contract price, it becomes unnecessary to find a right in the suppliers
in order to justify the surety's claim to contract balances. This may
lead to a re-examination of this asserted right of the suppliers.
It seems safe to conclude that Pennsylvania has adopted the
prevailing view that a payment bond imposes an obligation on the
contractor to the owner to pay his suppliers, that the breach of that
obligation will permit the owner to retain contract balances and
utilize them to cure this default, and that the surety may, under principles of subrogation, be substituted for the owner with respect to
this right. In going further and recognizing a right of unpaid suppliers
to be paid from the contract balance, Jacobs opens some interesting
avenues for exploration by unpaid suppliers in situations in which
there is no surety to pay for the contractor's defaults. It may be,
however, that this right will prove to be ephemeral when offered as
the sole basis for a right to recover.
30. Supra, note 7.
31. 132 F. Supp. 202 (Ct. CI. 1955),

32. 93 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. CI. 1950).
33. 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. CI. 1955), cert. denied, sub. non. First Nat'l Bank v.

United States, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).

34. 319 F.2d 893 (Ct. CI. 1963).
35. Eg., Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River Contract Co., 271 Fed. 144
(6th Cir. 1921).
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